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claim against the Board of Education, was told that no notice of
claim was necessary until he had recovered from all the injuries
sustained. Such inquiry was made well within the ninety-day
filing period but the misrepresentation effectively precluded plaintiff
from filing a timely notice of claim. 3 1 There are statutory provisions allowing filing of a late notice of claim. A request to
file a late notice, however, must be made within one year after
the accrual of the cause.32
The court treated the plaintiff's cause not as one requesting
a mere extension to file a notice of claim, but rather considered
the fraud practiced on the plaintiff as a separate wrong for which
the defendant was responsible. Thus, the court allowed the plaintiff
to file a late notice of claim solely on the basis of the defendant's
fraud. The plaintiff must still establish the fraud cause of action,
but once he is successful the damages may be calculated with
regard to the original wrong for which the fraudulent misrepresentations precluded recompense. Since fraud was a separate
and distinct tort under these circumstances, the holding
is con33
sistent with the current trend of the New York courts.
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CPLR 301: "Doing business" in New York.
Although a foreign corporation not subject to the court's
jurisdiction under the "long-arm" statute (CPLR 302) must be
"doing business" or "present" in order to be subject to in personam
jurisdiction in New Yorkm it appears that the "presence" requirement of prior case law, which served as a means for determining whether a corporation was "doing business," has been
somewhat relaxed. By this it is not meant that "presence" has
been abandoned as a standard, but rather that a liberal construction has been given to its meaning.
Significant among the cases heralding this trend is Bryant v.
Finnish Natl Airline.35 There, the plaintiff, a New York resident,
was injured at a Paris airport as a result of the defendant's alleged
negligence. The defendant, an unregistered foreign corporation,
had no officer or director in the United States and used no Amer§ 50-e (5).
32 Ibid.
3 DeVito v. New York Cent. Sys., 22 App. Div. 2d 600, 257 N.Y.S2d
895 (1st Dep't 1965); Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 N.Y. 259, 11
N.E.2d
902 (1937).
34
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915
(1917).
35 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
31 N.Y. Mumic. LAw
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ican airspace or airport. The sum of the defendant's New York
activities consisted of the work of seven employees in a New York
office who accepted reservations from travel agencies for Finnair
flights in Europe, a New York bank account for salaries and
expenses and occasional advertising and publicity. The Court of
Appeals reversed the appellate division's holding that the defendant
was not doing business in New York 36 and held that the test for
"doing business" is a "simple pragmatic one" which is satisfied7
3
when the sum of the defendant's activities in this state is evaluated.
In so holding, the Court repeatedly alluded to the fact that a
permanent New York office was the base of the defendant's activities. This was deemed necessary to satisfy the requirement
that there be continuity of action from a permanent locale.U
In the light of modern corporate activities, the liberal trend of
the courts in the "doing business" area appears to be quite
satisfactory.
CPLR 301: Subsidiary deemed agent for service of process.
In Taca Int'l Airlines v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 9 the
defendant-parent corporation owned all the stock of Rolls-Royce of
Canada, Ltd., which in turn owned the stock of Rolls-Royce, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in New York.
The Delaware subsidiary sold only the products of the parent,
and its officers were from either the Canadian or the English
corporations. There were several common directors, the policies of
the Delaware corporation were formulated by the executives of all
three companies and the net income of the Delaware corporation
appeared on the balance sheet of the defendant. The Court held
that the parent was doing business through the subsidiary and
hence the latter was not an independent entity but rather a mere
department of the parent. Though it be true that as a matter
of form the subsidiary appears to be an independent concern, if,
in reality, it is merely the agent of the parent, form "is merely
a veil which the court may cast aside to bring to light the true
picture." 49 Such was the case in Taca and, under these circumstances, service upon the subsidiary will bind the parent.
36 Bryant v. Finnish Nat!l Airline, 22 App. Div. 2d 16, 253 N.Y.S2d
215 (1st Dep't 1964).

3 Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439,

441-42, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628-29 (1965).
38 Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distrib. Co., 299 N.Y. 208,
210, 86 N.E.2d 564, 565 (1948).
39 15 N.Y2d 97, 204 N.E.2d 329, 256 N.Y.S2d 129 (1965).
40 Goodman v. Pan Am. World Airways, 1 Misc. 2d 959, 962, 148 N.Y.S.2d
353, 357 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 2 App. Div. Zd 707, 153 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d
Dep't 1956).

